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ABSTRACT
A case named In re Qimonda AG generated an appeal in the
Fourth Circuit, which raised an important issue concerning Chapter
15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The issue was whether the administrator
of a foreign insolvency proceeding may circumvent U.S. public policy
by invoking "comity" under Chapter 15, or whether the public policy
exception in Chapter 15 prevents such a result. The specific question
presented was whether Chapter 15 permits a foreign administrator to
avoid the application of Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which was enacted by Congress with the explicit goal of furthering the
public policy of supporting the high tech industry by providing protec-
* Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law.
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tion for intellectual property license agreements. In a 2007 article, and
without any knowledge of Qimonda AG, I described a hypothetical
situation in which the battle over the public policy exception might be
triggered by a theoretical corporation filing for bankruptcy. In that
hypothetical, the company owned and operated factories in the United
States and Germany, and had thousands of creditors and employees in
both countries. The hypothetical further contemplated that the com-
pany was incorporated in Germany, had its headquarters in Munich,
owned and operated factories in Bavaria, and had half of its employ-
ees and creditors in Germany. The hypothetical concluded by finding
that if the company filed for bankruptcy protection, it would be almost
certain that Germany would be deemed to be the center of its main
interests. Consequently, application of the pure universalist ideal
would result in the German court taking control of the case and apply-
ing German bankruptcy law to the disposition of all of the assets and
claims.
This hypothetical has now become a reality. Qimonda AG is a
company incorporated in Germany, and has its headquarters in
Munich. The public policy exception has been directly triggered by
this case. The purpose of this paper is to support the Bankruptcy
Court's decision. After completion of this paper, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision and held that Chapter 15
does not .permit the circumvention of Section 365(n).
I. INTRODUCTION
In my three prior articles on Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, I
warned against the overbroad interpretation of Chapter 15 advanced by
those who support the "universalist" approach to transnational bankrupt-
cies.' Universalists argue that the insolvency law of the debtor's home
1 E.g. John J. Chung, Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and Its Implicit
Assumptions Regarding the Foreign Exchange Market, 76 TENN. L. REv. 67 (2008);
John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward Erosion
of National Sovereignty, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 89 (2006) [hereinafter The New
Chapter 15]; John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Lesson from Maritime Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253 (2007)
[hereinafter The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15].
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 2005 and tracks the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency promulgated by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL" and "Model Law") in 1997. See H.R. REP.
No. 109-31, at 21-35 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 105-07; see also In re
Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 2012).
The universalist approach to transnational bankruptcies is based on the concept of
"one law, one court." Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible? 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 31, 40 (2001). This approach envisions a single bankruptcy proceeding in
the debtor's "home country" where a single court applies the bankruptcy law of its
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country should apply to all of the matters and relationships of the debtor
around the world, even if such matters and relationships have no connec-
tion to the debtor's home country, the relationships were formed under
the laws of another country, or the law of the home country undermines
the policies of the other country.2 Under universalism, a corporation
takes the bankruptcy laws of its home country wherever it goes and into
every country in which it does business.' The bankruptcy laws of its
home country displace and override the bankruptcy laws of all other
countries, even if the laws of the debtor's home country are in direct con-
flict with the laws of the other country.4
country and makes a unified worldwide distribution to creditors through liquidation
or reorganization. Jay L. Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, 23 PENN. ST.
INT'L L. REV. 625, 625-26 (2005). That court would have global jurisdiction over all of
the debtor's assets and creditors, wherever located. Frederick Tung, Fear of
Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 555, 561
(2001). Universalism requires a country to defer to a foreign legal proceeding, even
with respect to property within its own territory and legal relationships formed and
wholly conducted within its own borders. Id. at 569.
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the harmonization of one
worldwide, substantive law of bankruptcy. The most common model of
universalism, however, follows a pluralist route. Sidestepping the issue of which
substantive provisions the ideal bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects
from one of the pre-existing bankruptcy regimes ex post.
John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy,
45 VA .1 INT'L L. 935, 948 (2005).
In contrast, territorialism is the traditional practice of nations exercising exclusive
jurisdiction over assets and parties within their borders. Lynn LoPucki, The Case for
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216,2218-21
(2000). "It is the default rule in every substantive area of law, including . . .
bankruptcy." Id. at 2218. It rests upon traditional notions of national sovereignty,
which means that the law of the sovereign is imposed on all people and property
within its territorial reach. Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General
Default: Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (2002). To its detractors, territorialism is referred to pejoratively as
the "grab rule" because each nation's court grabs the assets within its jurisdiction for
distribution under its own laws. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In
Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179 (2000). In a transnational
bankruptcy conducted under the principles of territorialism, each country decides
under its own laws how the debtor's assets within its territory will be treated in the
face of creditor claims, without deferring to any foreign proceeding involving the
same debtor. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality, supra, at
2218.
2 See Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 1, at 40-41.
3 See id.
4 I have previously described universalism in a previous article:
[A]t its heart, universalism is about the displacement of national law in favor of
foreign law. The intended effect and ultimate goal is to remove entire classes of
people and transactions from the protection of their national law and subject
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Fortunately, Chapter 15 contains a public policy exception, which
states: "Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take
an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly con-
trary to the public policy of the United States."' Universalists insist on an
extremely narrow interpretation and application of the public policy
exception.6 In my prior articles, however, I argued for the broadest inter-
pretation and application.
them to foreign law. Under universalism, an American citizen whose
transactions are exclusively within the United States will be forced into a foreign
court applying foreign law in the event of bankruptcy by a foreign counterparty
- even if the parties expected local law to apply.
The New Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 90.
In the universalist's world view, an American citizen should give up the
protection of U.S. law and become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of foreign
law in the event of bankruptcy if she: (i) sold goods or services on credit to a
foreign corporation, (ii) was an employee of a foreign company, or (iii) was
injured by a foreign corporation. In effect, a foreign corporation brings to the
United States all of its domestic bankruptcy law and supplants American law in
its entirety. The bankruptcy of a major multinational company would thus result
in thousands of employees and creditors, and thousands of transactions losing the
protection of American laws. An entire social and commercial stratum would be
carved out of the country's sovereignty and subjected to foreign law.
Id. at 105-106.
5 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006).
6 In interpreting and applying Chapter 15, U.S. courts are called upon to look to
the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law Insolvency ("the Guide")
that was promulgated in connection with the approval of the Model Law. U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (Dec. 19, 1997); see In re Tri-
Continental Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 633 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). By using the
phrase "manifestly contrary" in § 1506, Congress intended that the public policy
exception be narrowly construed, which is consistent with the explication in the
Guide. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 109 (2005), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172 (citing the Guide in omitted footnote). The House
Report explains:
[Section 1506] follows the Model Law article 5 exactly, is standard in
UNCITRAL texts, and has been narrowly interpreted on a consistent basis in
courts around the world. The word "manifestly" in international usage restricts
the public policy exception to the most fundamental policies of the United States.
Id. at 109.
The Guide elaborates:
88. For the applicability of the public policy exception in the context of the Model
Law it is important to note that a growing number of jurisdictions recognize a
dichotomy between the notion of public policy as it applies to domestic affairs, as
well as the notion of public policy as it is used in matters of international
cooperation and the question of recognition of effects of foreign laws. It is
especially in the latter situation that public policy is understood more restrictively
than domestic public policy. This dichotomy reflects the realization that
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I predicted that, at some point, U.S. courts would be confronted with
the issue of the scope of the public policy exception and that a foreign
debtor would argue for the application of a foreign law that directly con-
travenes strong U.S. policy concerns as expressed by Congress.' In an
article published in 2007, I described a hypothetical situation in which the
battle over the public policy exception might be triggered:
To illustrate, suppose a company owns and operates factories in the
United States and Germany, and has thousands of creditors and
employees in both countries. Suppose further that the company was
incorporated in Germany, has its headquarters in Munich, owns and
operates factories in Bavaria, and has half of its employees and cred-
itors in Germany. If this company filed for bankruptcy protection, it
is almost certain that Germany would be deemed to be the center of
its main interests. Consequently, application of the pure universalist
ideal would result in the German court taking control of the case and
applying German bankruptcy law to the disposition of all of the
assets and claims. Thus, unpaid creditors in the United States would
be required to seek repayment in the German court, and their rights
international cooperation would be unduly hampered if public policy would be
understood in an extensive manner.
89. The purpose of the expression "manifestly", used also in many other
international legal texts as a qualifier of the expression "public policy", is to
emphasize that public policy exceptions should be interpreted restrictively and
that article 6 is only intended to be invoked under exceptional circumstances
concerning matters of fundamental importance for the enacting State.
Id. at 1 88-89.
7 For example, I wrote:
At this time, the scope and contours of the new law are still untested and
unknown. Its first few years will likely generate a struggle between those with a
more traditional view of bankruptcy law versus those whose goal is to
internationalize it, with the two sides seeking to narrow or expand the meaning
and application of Chapter 15. This struggle will be a continuation of the debate
between the two competing and polar models of transnational bankruptcy law -
territorialism and universalism.
The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 253.
I went on to add:
[T]he new Chapter 15 will likely generate debate regarding the extent to which it
promotes or achieves the goals of universalism. The battleground for this debate
will likely be Section 1506, the public policy exception. Because many of the
operative provisions of Chapter 15 are mandatory, the primary means to avoid
their application will be to raise and prevail on the threshold issue of whether the
requested rulings violate public policy. The proponents of universalism will
argue that the public policy exception is designed to be an extremely narrow
exception to be applied in the rare case. They need to advance this position
because a broad application of Section 1506 would frustrate the basic purpose of
universalism. Those with an opposing view will argue for a wide and liberal
application of the exception, to the point where it literally becomes the exception
that swallows the rule.
Id. at 260-61.
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would be determined by German bankruptcy law. This would be the
situation even if the American creditors had engaged in transactions
exclusively within the boundaries of the United States.8
Although it was clear to me that the courts would ultimately have to
rule on the public policy exception, I did not know that the specific facts
of this hypothetical would be so close to reality.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
is an issue generated by the bankruptcy case of In re Qimonda AG. The
appeal is styled Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.' Qimonda AG
("Qimonda") is a German company with its headquarters in Munich."o
At one time, Qimonda was a major producer of dynamic random access
memory ("DRAM") chips and, as a result, claims to hold approximately
12,000 patents, including at least 4000 U.S. patents." Between 1995 and
2008, Qimonda entered into joint venture and patent cross-licensing
agreements with numerous corporations, including Elpida Memory, Inc.,
Infineon Technologies, Micron Technology, Nanya Technology Corpora-
tion, and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (collectively, the "Counter-Par-
ties"). 12 Pursuant to these agreements, Qimonda and the Counter-Parties
perpetually and irrevocably cross-licensed tens of thousands of patents.13
In January 2009, Qimonda commenced insolvency proceedings in
Munich, and a German insolvency expert was appointed to administer
the Qimonda estate.14After his appointment, the Administrator, Michael
Jaffe ("The Administrator" or "Qimonda Administrator"), appeared in
U.S. Bankruptcy Court and filed a petition pursuant to Chapter 15 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code for recognition of the German insolvency pro-
ceeding." In July 2009, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court issued an order rec-
ognizing the German proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under
11 U.S.C. § 1517.16
After Chapter 15 recognition, the Administrator sent letters to several
of the Counter-Parties electing nonperformance of the patent cross-
licensing agreements; in doing so, the Administrator invoked German
8 The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 254.
9 The appellant, Michael Jaffe, is the administrator of the estate of Qimonda AG.
See In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. 547, 552 (E.D. Va. 2010). The Record Number of
the appeal is 12-1802. Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 12-1802 (4th Cir. Filed
June 28, 2012), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca4/12-
1802/.
10 In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 551-52.
11 Id. at 552.
12 Id. at 553.
13 Id. at 552.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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Insolvency Code § 103." The Counter-Parties objected and argued that
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) prohibited the Administrator's action." On appeal to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the issue
presented was whether the Administrator could terminate the parties'
cross-licensing agreements without the Counter-Parties' consent, as alleg-
edly permitted by the German Insolvency Code,"9 or whether § 365(n)
precludes such an action.2 0 The District Court remanded the matter back
to the Bankruptcy Court "so that it may, in the first instance, determine
whether the relief granted violates fundamental U.S. public policies
under § 1506 and principles discussed here."2 1 After remand, the Bank-
ruptcy Court issued the following ruling:
Thus, the court determines that failure to apply § 365(n) under the
circumstances of this case and this industry would "severely
impinge" an important statutory protection accorded licensees of
U.S. patents and thereby undermine a fundamental U.S. public pol-
icy promoting technological innovation. For that reason, the court
holds that deferring to German law, to the extent it allows cancella-
tion of the U.S. patent licenses, would be manifestly contrary to U.S.
public policy.22
As outlined in my earlier articles on Chapter 15,23 I believe that the
Bankruptcy Court's decision in Qimonda is correct, and, accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit should affirm. A final, judicial resolution of Qimonda will
set the tone for the future of Chapter 15. This is why the Qimonda case is
important. In 2007, I wrote:
At this time, the scope and contours of the new law are still untested
and unknown. Its first few years will likely generate a struggle
between those who have a more traditional view of bankruptcy law
and those whose goal is to internationalize it, with the two sides
seeking to narrow or expand the meaning and application of Chapter
15. This struggle will be a continuation of the debate between the
two competing and polar models of transnational bankruptcy law -
territorialism and universalism.24
This struggle is now squarely before the Court of Appeals.
17 Id. at 553.
18 Id. at 559-60.
19 Id. at 554.
20 Id. at 555-56.
21 Id. at 571.
22 In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
23 See Chung, Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and Its Implicit Assumptions,
supra note 1; see also The New Chapter 15, supra note 1; see also The Retrogressive
Flaw of Chapter 15, supra note 1.
24 The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 253.
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Part II of this Article discusses the public policy concerns that resulted
in § 365(n). Section 365(n) governs the treatment of intellectual property
licenses in bankruptcy proceedings.25 It was enacted by Congress in
order to overturn a decision by the Fourth Circuit in a case called
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.2 6 The purpose of
§ 365(n) is to protect licensees of intellectual property.2 7 As expressly
stated in the legislative history, Congress enacted it to promote techno-
logical innovation, and designed it to prevent the type of action taken by
the Qimonda Administrator.28 However, the Qimonda Administrator
argues that German law permits him to cancel Qimonda's patent licenses
with the Counter-Parties, that Chapter 15 recognition of the foreign main
proceeding means the U.S. courts must defer to the German proceeding
under the principle of international comity, and, consequently, that Ger-
man law applies.29 The Counter-Parties, in turn, argue that the public
policy exception in § 1506 protects them from the application of German
law and that U.S. law applies to the treatment of the licenses.3 0 Specifi-
cally, they argue that § 365(n) prevents the Administrator from canceling
the licenses.'
Parts III, IV, and V discuss the comity argument and summarize the
judicial attempts to define comity. This Article points out the problems
with relying on comity in Qimonda or any other case. The scholarly liter-
ature explains that comity is an amorphous concept, so much so that it is
almost meaningless.3 2 Courts have attempted to define it for more than a
century, but have never formed a workable definition. 3 The courts have
been tasked with the duty to apply the concept, even though there is no
definition to guide them. Given the ambiguities inherent in a concept
like comity, it was inevitable that a foreign administrator would attempt
to use it to evade otherwise applicable U.S. law. This Article argues,
however, that comity cannot support the weight placed on it by the
Administrator's argument. Whatever comity may mean, it does not per-
mit a party to circumvent or undermine U.S. public policy. If anything,
25 11 U.S.C. § 365 addresses and governs the treatment of executory contracts in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). In general, a bankruptcy trustee has the right
to "assume" or "reject" an executory contract. Id. Section 365(n) applies specifically
to executory contracts in the form of intellectual property licenses. Id. at § 365(n).
26 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
27 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 7-11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204-
08.
28 Id.
29 Lubrizol Enters, 756 F.2d at 1043-44.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Janis, infra note 53, at 338-41
33 See id.
IN RE QIMONDA AG
the case law holds that comity should not be accorded deference if, in
doing so, substantive harm is imposed on U.S. interests.
Part VI discusses the structure and text of Chapter 15 to explain that
considerations of comity must necessarily be subordinate to public policy.
The original purpose of Chapter 15 was to promote administrative conve-
nience in cross-border insolvency cases. Nonetheless, cases like Qimonda
present situations where a party is attempting to stretch Chapter 15
beyond its administrative goals. This Article argues that Chapter 15 was
not designed to inflict substantive harm (especially in sensitive areas of
public policy), and that the public policy exception should apply in cases
like this in order to prevent such harn.
II. THE PUBLIC POOLIcy EMBODIED IN 11 U.S.C. § 365(N)
Section 365(n) was added to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Intel-
lectual Property Act.34 The enactment of § 365(n) was a'direct response
to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Lubrizol.3 5 In that case, Richmond
Metal Finishers ("RMF") entered into a contract in 1982 with Lubrizol
that granted Lubrizol a nonexclusive license to use a metal coating pro-
cess technology owned by RMF.36 In 1983, RMF filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), RMF sought to
reject the licensing contract with Lubrizol (which was found to be an
executory contract) in order to facilitate the sale or licensing of the tech-
nology unhindered by the provisions of the Lubrizol contract.3" The
bankruptcy court approved the rejection of the contract, and the Fourth
Circuit ordered entry of judgment in conformity with the bankruptcy
court's decision.39
High-technology industry groups viewed the Lubrizol decision as a
grave threat to their way of business and quickly mobilized a successful
effort to have Congress overturn the Fourth Circuit's decision.4 0 In 1987,
the Intellectual Property Protection Act was introduced in Congress and
enacted in 1988.41 The legislative history provides insight into the pur-
pose of the bill:
34 Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat.
2538 (1988) (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. H§ 101(52)-(53), 365(n) (1994)) (the
"Intellectual Property Act").
3 S. REP. No. 100-505 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200.
36 Lubrizol Enters., 756 F.2d at 1045.
3 Id.
38 Id.
3 Id.
40 See WILLIAM D. WARREN, DANIEL J. BUSSEL & DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.,
BANKRUPTCy 236 (9th ed. 2012).
41 Id. "[The Act's] sponsors were an industry coalition of the largest high-
technology companies. This Act overturns Lubrizol with respect to intellectual
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The purpose of the bill is to amend Section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licen-
see to use the licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a
result of the rejection of the license pursuant to Section 365 in the
event of the licensor's bankruptcy. Certain recent court decisions
interpreting Section 365 have imposed a burden on American tech-
nological development that was never intended by Congress in
enacting Section 365. The adoption of this bill will immediately
remove that burden and its attendant threat to the development of
American Technology and will further clarify that Congress never
intended for Section 365 to be so applied.4 2
The legislative history goes on to provide:
Several recent court decisions, including Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 765 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 106 S.Ct. 1285 (1986), have interpreted Section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the 'Code') as providing a basis for permitting a
licensor of intellectual property to strip its licensee of any continuing
right to use the licensed intellectual property under the auspices of
rejecting the license as an executory contract. Under the Code, a
trustee or debtor in possession may be permitted to reject - that is, to
breach - an executory contract when, in its business judgment as
reviewed by the court, it concludes that affirmative ongoing perform-
ance of the contract would not be beneficial to the estate. These
cases, however, have relieved the debtor not simply of its ongoing
affirmative performance obligations under the executory license
agreement, but also of its passive obligation to permit the licensee to
use the intellectual property as provided in the license. Under this
view, since rejection results in valuable rights apparently reverting to
the bankruptcy estate-rights which the bankruptcy estate otherwise
would have to share with the licensee-rejection will nearly always be
arguably beneficial to the bankruptcy estate and any exercise of busi-
ness judgment, however reviewed by the court, will lead to rejection.
This view, which several courts have not modified under their powers
in equity, leaves licensees in a precarious position and thus threaten
the very flexible and beneficial system of intellectual property licens-
ing which has developed in the United States. Congress never antici-
pated that the presence of executor obligations in an intellectual
property license would subject the licensee to the risk that, upon
bankruptcy of the licensor, the licensee would lose not only any
future affirmative performance required of the licensor under the
property by adding subsection (n) to § 365, which allows licensees to retain rights in
intellectual property conveyed to them before the licensor's bankruptcy." Id.
42 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3200.
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license, but also any right of the licensee to continue to use the intel-
lectual property as originally agreed in the license agreement.
The court decisions on Section 365 that have stripped intellectual
property licensees of their right to continue to use the licensed prop-
erty have gained wide notice. They threaten an end to the system of
licensing of intellectual property (discussed below) that has evolved
over many years to the mutual benefit of both the licensor and the
licensee and to the country's indirect benefits. Because of the insta-
bility that Section 365 has introduced into the licensing relations,
parties who would have formerly accepted licenses - the right to use
another's intellectual property - are now forced to demand assign-
ments-outright transfer of ownership of the intellectual property.
This change in basic format is wasteful and cumbersome and is espe-
cially chilling to small business technologists. It is not an overstate-
ment to say that the change is a fundamental threat to the creative
process that has nurtured innovation in the United States.43
Further, the meaning of § 365(n) was immediately apparent to
practitioners.
Congress enacted Bankruptcy Code Section 365(n) in 1988 to protect
licensees and assignees of copyrights and other forms of intellectual
property. This amendment was a reaction to the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc., that a technology licensor could unilaterally reject its license
agreement under Section 365 and eliminate the right of the licensee
to use the intellectual property. . . . By implementing Section 365(n)
Congress sought to reverse the potentially chilling effect on the
licensing of intellectual property as a result of the Lubrizol
decision."
The legislative history of § 365(n) clearly states the purpose of the sub-
section: to thwart the "fundamental threat" to technological innovation."5
In turn, § 1506 was designed to make sure that public policy concerns
such as those embodied in § 365(n) would not be undermined as a result
of Chapter 15.46 The Qimonda Administrator, however, argues that con-
gressional concern and the public policy underlying § 365(n) should be
disregarded.4 7 Did Congress intend Chapter 15 to override all other pub-
lic policies in the Code? This is the question at stake.
43 Id. at 2-3, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3201-02 (emphasis added).
44 David S. Kupetz, Intellectual Property Issues in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases, 42, J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 68, 73-74 (1994).
' S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3202.
46 H.R. REP. No. 109-31 (I), at 109, 309 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88.
47 See In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 553.
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III. THE INTRODUCTION OF COMITY INTO CHAPTER 15
The concept of international comity appears in Chapter 15 in 11 U.S.C.
H 150748 and 1509."* The Fifth Circuit has noted:
Central to Chapter 15 is comity . ... Within the context of Chapter
15, however, it is raised to a principal objective. Section 1501(a)
begins by listing, as one of Chapter 15's goals, the furtherance of
cooperation between domestic and foreign courts in cross-border
insolvency cases. Section 1508 goes on to provide that Chapter 15's
provisions shall be interpreted by considering "its international ori-
gin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is
consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign
jurisdictions. 0
48 Subsection (b) provides in its entirety:
In determining whether to provide additional assistance under this title or under
other laws of the United States, the court shall consider whether such additional
assistance, consistent with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure -
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the debtor's
property;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of the
debtor;
(4) distribution of proceeds of the debtor's property substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by this title; and
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns."
11 U.S.C. § 1507(b) (2006).
49 Section 1509(b)(3) provides: "If the court grants recognition under section 1517,
and subject to any limitations that the court may impose consistent with the policy of
this chapter . . . (3) a court in the United States shall grant comity or cooperation to
the foreign representative." 11 U.S.C. §1509(b)(3) (2006).
50 In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 2012). In In re Vitro,
the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Bankruptcy Court's decision denying enforcement of a
Mexican reorganization plan. Id. The Bankruptcy Court denied enforcement
because the plan would extinguish the obligations of non-debtor guarantors. Id. at
1036. The appeal was filed by Vitro's foreign representative pursuant to his authority
under Chapter 15. Id. at 1040-41. On appeal, the appellees invoked § 1506 and
argued that enforcement of the plan would violate public policy. Id. at 1053. In its
decision to affirm the Bankruptcy Court's order, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined
to rule on § 1506 issue:
As already discussed, this court holds that the Bankruptcy Code precludes non-
consensual, non-debtor releases. . . . Nevertheless, not all our sister circuits agree,
and we recognize that the relief potentially available under § 1507 was intended
to be expansive. At the same time, § 1506 was intended to be read narrowly, a
fact that does not sit well with the bankruptcy court's broad description of the
fundamental policy at stake as 'the protection of third party claims in a
bankruptcy case' . . . . Because we conclude that relief is not warranted under
§ 1507, however, and would also not be available under § 1521, we do not reach
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Understandably, the Administrator argues that "comity" requires the
U.S. courts to permit him to cancel the licenses. The problem, however,
is that "comity" requires no such result.
A. A Summary of the Attempts to Define Comity by U.S. Courts
International comity may be generally understood as "the respect that
U.S. courts give to the laws, acts, and decisions of foreign countries.""
The U.S. Supreme Court provided the classic definition of comity more
than a century ago:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who
are under the protection of its laws.5 2
Issues of comity typically arise in cases involving the enforceability of
foreign judgments." Hilton v. Guyot was one such case. 54 The issue in
Hilton was whether a judgment issued in France should have conclusive
effect in the United States." The Court addressed enforcement as an
issue of comity:5 1
whether the Concurso plan would be manifestly contrary to a fundamental public
policy of the United States.
Id. at 1069-70 (citations omitted). The court also declined to address the arguments
that the Mexican reorganization plan violates a fundamental public policy for
infringing on the absolute priority rule, the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, or the interests of the United States in protecting
creditors from so called "bad faith schemes." Id. at 1070.
s CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 133
(4th ed. 2011).
52 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
53 See MARK W. JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAw 337 (5th ed. 2008); HENRY I.
STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 19-23 (3d ed.
1986).
54 Hilton, 159 U.S at 114.
55 Id. at 162.
56 In Hilton, the plaintiffs sought recovery of unpaid debts allegedly owed by
defendants (who were U.S. citizens) arising out of commercial purchases of gloves by
a business operated by the defendants. Id. at 114-15. The transactions occurred in
Paris. Id. at 114. The plaintiffs obtained judgment against the defendants in a French
court, and then commenced an action in U.S. district court pursuant to the French
judgment. Id. The defendants attempted to introduce evidence that the French
judgment had been obtained by fraud. Id. at 117-18. The district court refused to
admit the evidence, and the plaintiffs prevailed in the district court. Id. at 122. The
Supreme Court framed the issue as:
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No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sov-
ereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the
law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by
executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be
allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends
upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call "the comity
of nations." Although the phrase has been often criticized, no satis-
factory substitute has been suggested."
The Hilton opinion devoted numerous pages to an examination of prior
cases that attempted to provide a workable definition of comity. At one
point, the Court looked to the Supreme Court of Louisiana's view of
comity:
They have attempted to go too far, to define and fix that which can-
not, in the nature of things, be defined and fixed. They seem to have
forgotten that they wrote on a question which touched the comity of
[Tihe effect to which a judgment, purely executory, rendered in favor of a citizen
or resident of the country, in a suit there brought by him against a foreigner, may
be entitled in an action thereon against the latter in his own country - as is the
case now before us - presents a more difficult question, upon which there has
been some diversity of opinion.
Id. at 170-1.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back
to the trial court. Id. at 229. The Court ruled that the defendants should have been
permitted to introduce their evidence because evidence of fraud is admissible to
impeach a foreign judgment. Id. at 210. The Court also ruled that comity did not
support the plaintiffs because France would not treat an American judgment with
reciprocity. Id.
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a
court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the
foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs,
and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the
course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record,
the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least of the merits of the matter
adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign
court, unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by
showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of
international law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given
full credit and effect.
There is no doubt that both in this country, as appears by the authorities already
cited, and in England, a foreign judgment may be impeached for fraud.
Id. at 205-6. The Court added:
The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to be that
judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by the laws of
which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full
credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie
evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs' claim.
Id. at 227.
5 Id. at 163.
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nations, and that that comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it
must necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances which cannot
be reduced to any certain rule; that no nation will suffer the laws of
another to interfere with her own to the injury of her citizens; that
whether they do or not must depend on the condition of the country
in which the foreign law is sought to be enforced, the particular
nature of her legislation, her policy, and the character of her institu-
tions; that in the conflict of laws it must often be a matter of doubt
which should prevail; and that, whenever a doubt does exist, the
court, which decides, will prefer the laws of its own country to that of
the stranger.
Even though the Supreme Court acknowledges the role of comity in
international law, the Court has been unable to provide a workable defi-
nition of the concept. The most one can discern from the Court is that
comity exists and, at times, is a doctrine that should apply. However, the
Court is unable to provide any useful clarity as to its definition and mean-
ing. The problem is that the Bankruptcy Code now includes the word
"comity" in Chapter 15, and judges are under the burden of making rul-
ings based on a word that has eluded definition for over a century.
IV. WITHOUT A WORKABLE DEFINITION OF COMITY, JUDGES AND
LAWYERS HAVE No MEANINGFUL GUIDE REGARDING ITS
DEFINITION AND APPLICABILITY
How, then, are judges supposed to decide issues of comity? What
authority is there to guide an analysis of comity? In one widely cited
article, one scholar observed: "Nevertheless, the meaning of international
comity remains uncertain. Comity has been defined variously as the basis
of international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private
international law, a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, conve-
nience or goodwill between sovereigns. ...
In another widely cited article, a scholar wrote: "First, there is no
coherent generalized doctrine of 'comity' that informs how and when for-
eign acts are to be given effect in federal court.""o He added:
'[I]nternational comity' is ... an unfortunate phrase best dismissed
from the discourse. It is an expression of unexplained authority,
58 Id. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
59 Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1991). One
court echoed this view by stating: "Although courts in this country have long
recognized the principles of international comity and have advocated them in order to
promote cooperation and reciprocity with foreign lands, comity remains a rule of
'practice, convenience, and expediency' rather than of law." Pravin Banker Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997).
60 Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity," 83 IoWA L. REv. 893, 895
(1998).
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imprecise meaning and uncertain application. Its use confuses
inquiries that ought to be clear and distinct, and submerges issues
that should be carefully and forthrightly considered. Its invocation
has produced a series of international cases explicable only by refer-
ence to ill-defined judicial intuitions. Abandoning appeals to 'inter-
national comity' in favor of more precise terminology would go a fair
way toward rectifying the confusion that prevails in this area.
Other scholars question whether "comity" is even a principle of inter-
national law, remarking:
The principle of comity has sometimes been treated as a principle of
international law, but more often has been regarded as something
short of a legal limitation, more like an act of altruistic deference or
an acknowledgment of superior foreign interest (or lesser U.S. inter-
est) in the matter at hand.6 2
Despite the amorphous and ambiguous nature of comity, a few conclu-
sions may be drawn. "Comity" is not a magic word that requires a partic-
ular result. The only thing clear about its meaning is that it is fuzzy and
blurry. Courts have been unable to arrive at a settled meaning. Unfortu-
nately, the allure of international aspirations championed by Chapter 15's
proponents has led to the introduction of the word "comity" into the
Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy judges now have the task of attempting to
find meaning in a term that defies definition. Chapter 15 instructs judges
to promote comity, but provides no guidance on how to do so. This is
why the concept of "comity" makes it so easy for parties to request that
courts flout the clear text of other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.
Since it is so ill-defined, there are no boundaries on the resort to comity.
The availability of the "comity" argument permits any foreign representa-
tive to ask U.S. courts to disregard plain text and congressional intent. It
is unlikely that this was Congress's intent behind passing Chapter 15.
V. WHATEVER COMITY MAY MEAN, IT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
QIMONDA ADMINISTRATOR'S ACTIONS
The weight of opinion on the issue of comity leads to the conclusion
that comity is not a principle or goal that is to be pursued or exalted for
its own sake. A fair summary of the U.S. judicial opinions discussing
comity is that it should be accorded to another country's laws or proceed-
ings only if there is no material prejudice to U.S. interests. A basic view
is that in deciding issues of comity, "each state must evaluate the conflict-
ing interests and should defer to the state with the greatest interest."6 3
The Second Circuit stated that U.S. "courts will not extend comity to for-
61 Id. at 893.
62 BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 659 (4th ed. 2003).
63 Paul, supra note 59, at 46.
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eign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to the policies or prej-
udicial to the interests of the United States." 64 in another Second Circuit
case, the court observed, "[tihe principle of comity has never meant cate-
gorical deference to foreign proceedings. It is implicit in the concept that
deference should be withheld where appropriate to avoid the violation of
the laws, public policies, or rights of the citizens of the United States."6 1
In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, the D.C. Cir-
cuit described comity in this way:
"Comity" summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept
- the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act
of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum. Since
comity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each
claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it
imposes are inherently uncertain. However, the central precept of
comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals
should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters
international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby pro-
moting predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual
expectations. The interests of both forums are advanced - the for-
eign court because its laws and policies have been vindicated; the
domestic country because international cooperation and ties have
been strengthened. The rule of law is also encouraged, which bene-
fits all nations.
Comity is a necessary outgrowth of our international system of polit-
ically independent, socio-economically interdependent nation states.
As surely as people, products and problems move freely among
adjoining countries, so national interests cross territorial borders.
But no nation can expect its laws to reach further than its jurisdiction
to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Every nation must often rely
on other countries to help it achieve its regulatory expectations.
Thus, comity compels national courts to act at all times to increase
the international legal ties that advance the rule of law within and
among nations.
However, there are limitations to the application of comity. When the
foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying
comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize the aber-
ration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the realization of the
goals served by comity. No nation is under an unremitting obligation
to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to
those of the domestic forum. Thus, from the earliest times, authorities
64 Pravin Banker, 109 F.3d at 854.
65 In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2001).
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have recognized that the obligation of comity expires when the strong
public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act.6
This view of comity was expressed in Hilton.67 The Hilton decision
quoted a prior case in which Chief Justice Taney described comity as a
"voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible
when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests."" Therefore, if
the Fourth Circuit were to rule in favor of the Qimonda Administrator, it
would depart from a long and consistent line of case law.
A. The Qimonda Administrator's Reliance on Can. S. Ry. v. Gebhard
is Misplaced and Does Not Establish that Comity Trumps
Public Policy
To support his position, the Administrator relies on Can. S. Ry. Co. v.
Gebhard." He quotes the following sentence from that case: "[Elvery
person who deals with a foreign corporation . . . impliedly subjects him-
self to such laws of the foreign government, affecting the powers and obli-
gations of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the
known and established policy of that government authorizes."o Relying
on this sentence, the Administrator argues that the Counter-Parties sub-
jected themselves to German law by entering into contracts with a Ger-
man corporation.'
The Administrator's argument is wrong for at least three reasons: (1)
the facts show that at least two of the Counter-Parties expressly con-
tracted out of German law; (2) the facts of Gebhard are materially distin-
66 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (1984)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry
Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Federal courts generally extend comity
whenever the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and enforcement does not
prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy."); In re
Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347, 365 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[F]oreign laws ... must not be
repugnant to our laws and policies.").
67 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
68 Id. at 135.
69 Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
70 Brief for Appellant at 35, Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-1802 (4th Cir. filed
Sept. 26, 2012).
71 If the Adminstrator prevails, this would be the result:
In effect, a foreign corporation brings to the United States all of its domestic
bankruptcy law and supplants American law in its entirety. The bankruptcy of a
major multinational corporation would thus result in thousands of employees and
creditors, and thousands of transactions losing the protection of American laws.
An entire social and commercial stratum would be carved out of the country's
sovereignty and subjected to foreign law.
Chung, The New Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 105-6. However, as discussed below, the
Supreme Court issued a decision less than ten years ago that precludes this result.
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guishable; and (3) Gebhard's statement on contract and corporation law
is not valid today.
First, at least two of Qimonda's contracts specified the choice of Amer-
ican law. The contract at issue with Nanya Technology Corp. explicitly
chose the law of New York as the governing law.72 The contract at issue
with Intel explicitly chose the law of Delaware as the governing law.13
Thus, it is incorrect to conclude that the Counter-Parties voluntarily sub-
jected themselves to German law because at least two of the parties
expressly contracted out of German law and chose American law instead.
Second, the facts of Gebhard are materially distinguishable and bear
little resemblance to the Qimonda case. Gebhard involved the insolvency
of a quasi-public Canadian corporation whose operations were entirely in
Canada.7 4 The court concluded:
The obligor of the bonds and coupons here sued on was a corpora-
tion created for a public purpose; that is to say, to build, maintain,
and work a railway in Canada. It had its corporate home in Canada,
and was subject to the exclusive legislative authority of the Domin-
ion parliament. It had no power to borrow money or incur debts
except for completing, maintaining, and working its railway. The
bonds taken by the defendants in error showed on their face that
they were part of a series amounting in the aggregate to a very large
sum of money, and that they were secured by a trust mortgage on the
railway of the company, its lands, tolls, revenues, etc. In this way the
defendants in error, when they bought their bonds, were, in legal
effect, informed that they were entering into contract relations, not
only with a foreign corporation created for a public purpose, and
carrying on its business within a foreign jurisdiction, but with the
holders of other bonds of the same series, who were relying equally
with themselves for their ultimate security on a mortgage of property
devoted to a public use, situated entirely within the territory of a
foreign government."
The Gebhard opinion emphasized the point again:
This corporation was created in Canada to build and work a railway
in that dominion. Its principal business was to be done in Canada,
and the bulk of its corporate property was permanently fixed there.
All its powers to contract were derived from the Canadian govern-
ment, and all the contracts it could make were such as related
directly or indirectly to its business in Canada. That business affected
72 In re Qilmonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 171 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
7 Id. at 173.
74 The description of Canada Southern Railway as a "quasi-public" corporation is
found in the dissent. See Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
75 Id. at 536-37.
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the public interests, and the keeping of the railway open for traffic
was of the utmost importance to the people of the dominion."
Gebhard was about a Canadian corporation operating exclusively in
Canada, backed by the Canadian government. In contrast, the contracts
at issue in Qimonda have little to do with Germany. For example,
Qimonda and Micron entered into a world-wide, royalty-free cross-
license agreement, which recited that a "significant goal" of the agree-
ment was to provide each of the parties "with worldwide freedom to
make, use, import, offer to sell, sell, lease, license and/or otherwise trans-
fer" products "without concern for suits claiming infringement of the Pat-
ents . . . licensed hereunder."" Micron has no manufacturing operations
in Germany." Qimonda's contract with IBM concerns what is known as
"trench" technology, which IBM incorporates in semiconductor manufac-
turing. IBM manufactures all of its semiconductors in the United
States."o Qimonda's contract with Intel concerns patents applicable to
semiconductor chips manufactured by Intel in the United States, Israel,
and Ireland." Thus, Germany has little relationship to the activities
addressed in the patent license agreements. The only connection to Ger-
many is that Qimonda is incorporated there. Qimonda asserts, however,
that this fact by itself is enough to require the application of German law,
and cites Gebhard as support. It is easy to see that there is little similarity
in the facts of the two cases.
While Gebhard may have been "good" law in 1883, that is no longer
the case today.82 A recent Supreme Court case, Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd," emphatically proves this point. In Spector, the Court's
decision made clear that a U.S.-based party does not agree to be gov-
erned by non-U.S. law when it enters into a contract with a non-U.S.
counter-party." In Spector, the Supreme Court addressed whether Title
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199085 ("ADA") applied to
foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters.8 6 The Petitioners, dis-
abled individuals and their companions, were U.S. citizens or residents
who purchased tickets in 1998 or 1999 for round-trip cruises on two ships
76 Id. at 538.
7 Qimonda, 462 B.R. at 172.
78 Id.
7 Id. at 173.
80 Id. at 172.
81 Id. at 173.
82 To start, it is questionable whether a federal court opinion from 1883 addressing
a substantive issue of contract and corporations law is "good" law today given that it
was decided before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
83 See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
84 Id.
85 42 U.S.C. §12181 (1990).
86 Spector, 545 U.S. at 119.
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that departed from Houston. The ships were operated by Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd., a Bermuda corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in the United States. The ships at issue flew the flag of the Baha-
mas." The petitioners were plaintiffs in a class action filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas." Their complaint
alleged that the respondent, Norwegian Cruise Line, unlawfully discrimi-
nated against disabled passengers and failed to provide accommodations,
as required by the ADA."o The cruise line moved to dismiss the claims,
arguing that it was not required to comply with the ADA because the
ships were flagged under the laws of the Bahamas, and, consequently,
Bahamian law applied to the ships. Since the law of the Bahamas con-
trolled, the laws of the United States, including the ADA, did not apply."
In response to a motion to dismiss the claims, the district court ruled
that Title III generally applied to the cruise ships and allowed the claims
to proceed, only dismissing the claim based on physical barriers.92 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that general
statutes do not apply to foreign-flag vessels in U.S. territory absent a
clear statement of congressional intent.9 3 Because Title III does not con-
tain a specific provision mandating its application to foreign-flag vessels,
the Court of Appeals sustained the district court's dismissal of the peti-
tioners' barrier-removal claims and reversed the rulings on the remaining
Title III claims. 94 In other words, the cruise line won at the appellate
level.95
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling." The Court's
decision was noteworthy, in one respect, because of the splintered nature
of its ruling. Justice Kennedy announced the Court's judgment, but his
opinion is the opinion of the Court only with respect to Parts I, II.A.1,
and II.B.2, which four other Justices joined.97 The other parts of his opin-
ion were not supported by a majority. The line-up of the votes might
seem to suggest wide disagreement and, perhaps, confusion, over the
applicability of the ADA to foreign-flag vessels. However, six Justices
explicitly rejected the argument that foreign-flag vessels are beyond the
reach of the ADA.98
87 Id. at 126.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 127.
92 Id.
9 Id.
94 Id. at 127-28.
9 Id. at 141.
96 Id. at 142.
9 Id. at 124.
98 Id.
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Justice Kennedy's opinion noted the strong policies underlying the
ADA, explored the conflict between its policies, and the asserted protec-
tion of the law of the foreign-flag ships. He remarked:
Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience offer public accom-
modations and transportation services to over 7 million United
States residents annually, departing from and returning to ports
located in the United States. Large numbers of disabled individuals,
many of whom have mobility impairments that make other kinds of
vacation travel difficult, take advantage of these cruises or would like
to do so. To hold there is no Title III protection for disabled persons
who seek to use the amenities of foreign cruise ships would be a
harsh and unexpected interpretation of a statute designed to provide
broad protection for the disabled. § 12101. The clear statement rule
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, moreover,
would imply that other general federal statutes-including, for
example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S.
C. § 2000a et seq. - would not apply aboard foreign cruise ships in
United States waters. A clear statement rule with this sweeping
application is unlikely to reflect congressional intent."
The Court could not have been clearer in pronouncing that there are
limits to the "law of the flag." In light of the Court's holding, any force
that the doctrine may have must give way to more compelling policy con-
siderations. Given the important policies and aims of the ADA, it is not
surprising that the Court rejected the notion that a foreign flag is a shield
against the ADA's requirements. It is also clear that a majority of the
Court was not prepared to permit entire swathes of the U.S. population
to lose the protection of U.S. laws by a choice of flag. Thus, Spector
stands for the proposition that a U.S. based party does not agree to for-
eign law merely by entering into a contract with a foreign corporation.
Spector also stands for the proposition that foreign corporations may not
automatically evade U.S. public policies by invoking the law of their
home countries.
VI. THE STRUCTURE AND TEXT OF CHAPTER 15 EMPHASIZES THAT
PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS MUST TRUMP COMITY
"In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and to its object and policy.""oo With Chapter 15, Congress made clear its
object and policy. Section 1501 is titled "Purpose and Scope of Applica-
tion," and provides in part:
9 Id. at 132.
100 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (citing K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51
(1987)).
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The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms for
dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency with the objectives of -
(1) cooperation between - (A) courts of the United States, United
States trustees, trustees, examiners, debtors, and debtors in posses-
sion; and (B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign
countries involved in cross-border insolvency cases; (2) greater legal
certainty for trade and investment; (3) fair and efficient administra-
tion of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all
creditors, and other interested entities, including the debtor; (4) pro-
tection and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets; and (5)
facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby
protecting investment and preserving employment. 101
These enumerated factors show that the object and policy of Chapter
15 focuses on the procedure and administration of insolvency cases. The
emphasis is not on imposing substantive uniformity of law across borders.
Section 1501(a) begins by stating that Chapter 15 is designed to "provide
effective mechanisms for dealing with cases . . . ."102 The word "mecha-
nisms" makes sense with reference to procedural and administrative
mechanisms. The first factor, subparagraph (1), begins with the word
"cooperation." 03 Again, "cooperation" suggests procedural and admin-
istrative concerns. Subparagraph (3) states the objective and policy as
"fair and efficient administration."o10 Here, the emphasis on. administra-
tion is explicit.
Subchapter IV of Chapter 15 is exclusively focused on cross-border
"cooperation." 0 Section 1527, entitled "Forms of Cooperation,"
provides:
Cooperation referred to in sections 1525 and 1526 may be imple-
mented by any appropriate means, including - (1) appointment of a
person or body, including an examiner, to act at the direction of the
court; (2) communications of information by any means considered
appropriate by the court; (3) coordination of the administration and
supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; (4) approval or imple-
mentation of agreements concerning the coordination of proceed-
ings; and (5) coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the
same debtor. ' 6
These provisions, which commence Chapter 15 and recur throughout,
emphasize the administrative coordination of transnational cases. Chap-
101 I1 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (a) (West 2005).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1525-27 (West 2005).
106 11 U.S.C.A. § 1527 (West 2005).
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ter 15 was designed as a mechanism to enable courts to coordinate their
proceedings across borders.107 The Qimonda Administrator and univer-
salists attempt to distort Chapter 15's humble aims by expanding it to
impose the notion of "one court, one law" - regardless of a country's
substantive policy choices. There is nothing in the language of Chapter
15 stating that its goal is to create a global system of "one court, one law."
In order to understand the object and policy of Chapter 15, it is helpful
to examine the motivations for the creation of the Model Law and Chap-
ter 15. The Model Law and Chapter 15 were designed to address the
state of transnational bankruptcy law in the twentieth century. One com-
mentator described it as follows:
A survey made of the present status of international bankruptcy law
shows that a trustee in bankruptcy, even if appointed by the court of
the debtor's commercial domicile, has but a slight chance to recover
by legal proceedings assets that are located abroad. Only a few coun-
tries recognize the foreign trustee's title to property of the debtor.
Often the trustee is not admitted at all by the courts as the creditors'
or the estate's legal representative with power to claim the assets. If
admitted, his rights are rarely sustained against local creditors
attaching local assets. In some countries the trustee can qualify as the
legal representative of the foreign bankruptcy in submitting himself
to an exequatur proceeding, but liens secured by attachment before
his qualification are sustained. Almost nowhere does a foreign bank-
ruptcy, even when declared by the court of the commercial domicile
of the debtor, preclude another bankruptcy declaration by a local
court having bankruptcy jurisdiction. No collaboration is guaranteed
between the several administrations in the case of concurrent bank-
ruptcies. As each bankruptcy court follows its own law, the same
claim can be void in one proceeding and valid in another."os
This was the state of the world that the drafters of the Model Law
sought to improve. Before the promulgation of the Model Law, some
courts attempted to address the problems of cross-border cooperation
and coordination on a case-by-case basis.' 09
The Model Law was an attempt to establish a formal and regular sys-
tem of cooperation and coordination." 0 This was a modest and largely
unobjectionable goal. There is little reason to quibble with efforts to fur-
ther administrative cooperation. On its face, Chapter 15 does not impose
a global, substantive bankruptcy law. Instead, it looks rather benign with
its emphasis on cooperation across borders. Limiting Chapter 15 to this
extent would be uncontroversial, however, a case like Qimonda was
107 See id.
108 Kurt H. Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 58, 59-60 (1944).
109 See, e.g., In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
110 Chung, The New Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 100.
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bound to arise. It was inevitable that a party would attempt to use Chap-
ter 15 as a sword to undercut substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. Chapter 15's proponents introduced it into American law by cast-
ing it as an aid to administrative convenience. In an earlier article, how-
ever, I put forth a different view:
Unable to obtain the whole loaf of universalism, perhaps [Chapter
15's proponents] are happy with the half loaf of Chapter 15, knowing
that it represents a significant step toward the ultimate goal of uni-
versalism. This interpretation finds support in the expert and matter-
of-fact scholarship of universalism's proponents. The proponents
openly acknowledge that it was too much of a challenge to move the
United States and other nations to full universalism. The delegates
who agreed upon the Model Law knew they had to operate within
practical constraints. For example, the reason why a model law was
generated (rather than a treaty, for example) was because it would
have been too difficult to achieve consensus over anything more sub-
stantial than a model law. This explains why the Model Law does
not attempt to substantively unify the different bankruptcy laws
around the world; there never would have been agreement.
Appreciating the historic resistance to universalism, its proponents
set more modest goals for the Model Law. Thus, the purpose of the
Model Law is to advance universalism incrementally, by gradually
introducing the acceptance of outcome differences in transnational
insolvencies. The gradual process permits "acclimation" to
universalism."'
A. U.S. Courts Should Uphold the Primacy of the Public Policy
Exception over Comity
Qimonda is important because a circuit court must now squarely
address the issue of the scope of the public policy exception and its rela-
tionship to comity. 112 Does Chapter 15 permit the Qimonda Administra-
I Id. at 101.
112 The Fifth Circuit recently had the opportunity to rule on this issue in In re
Vitro, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012), but it structured its opinion to avoid the issue.
See id. The appeal in In re Vitro was the result of the consolidation of three cases
relating to the Mexican reorganization proceeding of Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. ("Vitro"),
a corporation organized under the laws of Mexico. Id. at 1036. The Ad Hoc Group of
Vitro Noteholders (the "Noteholders"), a group of creditors holding a substantial
amount of Vitro's debt, appealed the district court's decision affirming the bankruptcy
court's recognition, under Chapter 15, of the Mexican reorganization proceeding. Id.
Vitro and one of its largest third-party creditors, Fintech Investments, Ltd., filed
separate appeals directly to the circuit court seeking a reversal of the bankruptcy
court's decision denying enforcement of the Mexican reorganization plan because the
plan would extinguish the obligations of non-debtor guarantors. Id. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment recognizing the Mexican reorganization
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proceeding and the appointment of the foreign representatives. Id. More
importantly, for purposes of this Article, the court also affirmed the bankruptcy
court's order denying enforcement of the Mexican reorganization plan. Id.
To sum up the relevant portion of the appeal presented to the Fifth Circuit, the
bankruptcy court denied the Enforcement Motion on the ground that granting the
motion would violate public policy and that comity would not be observed. Id. at
1043. Vitro appealed this order. Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit was asked to rule directly
on whether the public policy exception prevented the granting of the Enforcement
Motion. Id. at 1053. However, the Fifth Circuit sidestepped the § 1506 issue by ruling
that it had other grounds to affirm the denial of the Enforcement Motion and that it
was unnecessary to rule whether public policy would be violated or not. Id. at 1069.
The opinion makes clear that the Fifth Circuit was reluctant to order the granting of
the Enforcement Motion because the result of that motion would mean that the non-
debtors would be released from their guaranties. Id. at 1061-62. The Fifth Circuit
emphasized that it had previously ruled in another case that the Bankruptcy Code
precludes non-consensual, non-debtor releases. Id. at 1069. Thus, if the Fifth Circuit
had reversed the denial of the Enforcement Motion, it would have undermined the
precedent already established in the circuit. Despite the fact that such releases were
not permitted in the Fifth Circuit, the court was unable to assert that honoring such
releases would be a violation of public policy. The court was unable to do so because
it noted that other circuits were of the view that such releases were permitted under
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. It would be unsupportable to assert that such releases
violated public policy in the United States when other circuits permit them.
Thus, the panel deciding Vitro found itself in a narrow spot. The circuit's own
precedent called for denial of the Enforcement Motion. However, due to the circuit
split, the public policy exception was not available as a basis for affirming the denial.
Id. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit achieved the result of affirming the denial of the
motion by examining the relationship between and grounds for relief available under
§§ 1507 and 1521. "Because we conclude that relief is not warranted under § 1507,
however, and would also not be available under § 1521, we do not reach whether the
Concurso plan would be manifestly contrary to a fundamental public policy of the
United States." Id. at 1070. The court declared:
To that end, we observe that many of the factors that might sway us in favor of
granting comity and reversing the bankruptcy court to that end are absent here.
Vitro has not shown that there existed truly unusual circumstances necessitating
the release. To the contrary, the evidence shows that equity retained substantial
value. The creditors also did not receive a distribution close to what they were
originally owed. Moreover, the affected creditors did not consent to the Plan, but
were grouped together into a class with insider voters who only existed by virtue
of Vitro reshuffling its financial obligations between it and its subsidiaries. It is
also not the case that the majority of the impacted group of creditors, consisting
predominantly of the Objecting Creditors, voted in favor of the Plan. Nor were
non-consenting creditors given an alternative to recover what they were owed in
full.
Id. at 1067.
The essential legal issue in Vitro was the enforceability of non-consensual, non-debtor
releases. The law of the Fifth Circuit holds that such releases are not permitted under
the Bankruptcy Code, but other circuits take the opposite view. For this reason, the
Vitro court could not invoke the public policy exception against the enforcement of
such releases. Qimonda, on the other hand, presents a clear case of public policy. 433
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tor to circumvent the explicit goal of Congress as embodied in Section
365(n)? Does the commencement of a German insolvency proceeding
mean that German law applies to every transaction of the German debtor
around the world, even though the transactions have little connection to
Germany? According to universalists, the answer is "yes." Again, this
stance was predictable. In 2006, I wrote in response:
It is also possible that universalism's supporters will argue that Chap-
ter 15 achieves the goal of 'one court, one law.' Now that Chapter 15
is law, they may argue that it fully embodies universalism and will
likely urge the courts to apply Chapter 15 as broadly as possible (to
the point, for example, where the public policy exception is rarely
applied). . . . This likely development underscores the point that the
enactment of Chapter 15 does not end the debate, but rather gives it
more urgency because substantive outcomes will depend on how
much of the universalist ideal will be read into it.113
B. Concerns Relating to Comity are Secondary to the Protection of
Public Policy
If there is any doubt that considerations of comity are given a
subordinate role to public policy in Chapter 15, examining the structure
and text of the Code removes such doubt. Section 1506 carries the title
"Public Policy Exception," and reads: "Nothing in this chapter prevents
the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the
action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States."' 14 This direct statement of the need to protect public policy
stands alone and emphasizes its importance by its isolation from other
Code sections and from other language unrelated to public policy in the
section.
Chapter 15's reference to "comity," on the other hand, is treated quite
differently. As discussed above, the references to comity are found in
§§ 1507(b) and 1509(b)(3)."' The word "comity" does not appear in the
titles of the sections that mention it. A couple of points stand out. First,
comity is not the exclusive focus of the sections in which it is mentioned,
indicating that judges should view it as a concept of lower importance
than public policy. More importantly, § 1509(b) states: "If the court
grants recognition under 1517, and subject to any limitations that the court
B.R. 547 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011). The public policy embodied in § 365(n) is explicit
and uniform across the country because it is in the plain text of the Code. The point is
Vitro presented high barriers to the application of § 1506. Qimonda presents a much
easier case. 433 B.R. 547.
113 Chung, The New Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 103.
114 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West 2005).
115 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1507(b), 1509(b)(3) (West 2005).
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may impose consistent with the policy of this chapter. ... " This phrase
means one thing: considerations of comity are subject to limitations
imposed by public policy. In other words, the court may act in deference
to considerations of comity if, and only if, it acts consistently with public
policy. Comity does not trump public policy; public policy trumps comity.
On a different, but related, point, the notion of comity is, at best, "soft"
law."' Public policy is also often a "soft" law concept. However, public
policy regarding the treatment of intellectual property licenses became
"hard" law when § 365(n) was added to the Bankruptcy Code. If the
Qimonda Administrator prevailed on his argument that considerations of
comity are more important than the public policy embodied in § 365(n), it
would mark a rare event - the elevation of "soft" law over "hard" law.
Such a result would be illogical and unsound.
VII. CONCLUSION
A reflexive or wooden deference to comity in Chapter 15 cases would
undermine the reason for including § 1506 as part of Chapter 15. The
public policy exception exists for a reason - to prevent substantive harm
to U.S. interests and goals and to protect public policy goals. In 2007, I
wrote:
[Section] 1506 is a safety valve that was deliberately inserted by Con-
gress into Chapter 15 to prevent mechanical applications of foreign
law. Despite the repeated expressions of support for global coopera-
116 11 U.S.C.A. § 1509(b)(3) (West 2005).
117 The distinction between "hard" law and "soft" law is a well-recognized feature
of international law. One scholar explained:
Some international lawyers distinguish between 'hard' and 'soft' international
law, a distinction with at least two meanings. First, the distinction may refer to
the difference between rules of law meant to be followed and norms meant
merely to set out preferred outcomes. . . . Second, the distinction between hard
and soft law may refer to the difference between formal sources of law (such as
treaties) and instruments that are not formally legal sources (such as mutual
declarations of government leaders issued at the end of a diplomatic conference).
MARK W. JANIS & JOHN NoYEs, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND COMMENTARY 49
(4th ed. 2011).
Other scholars have noted the blurry and amorphous nature of comity is a reflection
of the similar nature of international law in general:
In international law, the identification of legal rules is quite different than it is in
most municipal legal systems. The reason for this is directly linked to
international law's very nature. Given the international political system of
nation-states and the idea of state sovereignty, the sources of international law
cannot be equivalent to those of most domestic laws ...
Given the rarity of effective formal international legislative, executive, and
judicial organs, some have said quite simply that international law does not or
cannot exist and that the only real rules of law are those generated by sovereign
states for their own internal consumption.
MARK W. JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (5th ed. 2008).
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tion and harmony, Congress was concerned about how the applica-
tion of foreign law might affect domestic parties and interests, and
wanted to ensure that there would be a mechanism to prevent unac-
ceptable harm. 18
The concept of a "safety valve" is crucial, especially in a case like
Qimonda where comity is being wielded to evade such a clear expression
of public policy as contained in § 365(n). Recognizing the limitations of
its forward vision, Congress included the public policy exception in its
own separate section, apart from all other sections of Chapter 15, so that
U.S.-based interests would have protection from substantive results con-
trary to U.S. public policy.
Section 365(n) was added to the Bankruptcy Code to protect vital
American interests and public policy concerns. It is difficult to believe
that Congress enacted § 365(n) intending for it to be so easily frustrated
under the guise of something as ill-defined as comity. Comity poses little
problem when it is used to promote administrative convenience and when
there is no resulting substantive harm. The courts should not permit com-
ity to achieve a result that inflicts substantive harm on U.S. interests,
especially when the harm directly undermines the public policy explicitly
promoted by Congress.
Postscript: On December 3, 2013, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in
the Qimonda matter under the caption styled Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd., No. 12-1802, WL 26478864 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013). The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, and held that Chapter 15
does not permit the Qimonda administrator to escape the application of 11
U.S.C. sec. 365(n) and the public policy embedded in that section.
118 Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15, supra note 1, at 297.
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